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COMMENT 
SIGNAL LOST: IS A GPS TRACKING SYSTEM THE SAME AS 
AN EYEBALL? 
Eric Andrew Felleman*  
 
On November 8th, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in 
United States v. Jones. One of the primary issues in the case is 
whether law enforcement personnel violated Mr. Jones' Fourth 
Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures by using a GPS tracking device to monitor the location of 
his car without a warrant. The 7th Circuit and the 9th Circuit have 
both recently held that use of GPS tracking is not a search under 
the Fourth Amendment.1 
The Court will have to decide whether the information 
gathered by a GPS device is unique, or if it is sufficiently similar to 
information about an individual's location that we can gather with 
our basic senses. The government argues that this is a case of 
officers "observ[ing] matters conducted in the open, which anyone 
could see,"2 information which is not considered protected under 
the Fourth Amendment.3 Respondent Jones predictably responds 
that the GPS device generates unique data which is not actually 
open for anyone to see.4 Jones’ case will be significantly weakened 
if the Court agrees with the government's theory.5 
                                                   
      *      J.D. Candidate, December 2013, University of Michigan Law School. 
1. United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011), United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010). 
2. Brief of Petitioner at 12, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259. 
3. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-85 (1983). 
4.   Brief for Respondent at 11, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 ("Although a person 
traveling on public thoroughfares knowingly exposes himself to visual observation, he does 
not knowingly offer GPS data to public viewing. The government can obtain GPS data only 
by using a GPS device"). 
5.   A separate issue in the case is whether the physical placement of the GPS device 
was an improper search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. This will be decided by 
separate determinations. 
J 
2012 Signal Lost 15 
 
The issue is novel on its face, but can be viewed as another 
incarnation of what has become a common question in 
contemporary courtrooms: to what extent should new technology 
be treated as merely an extension or augmentation of its 
predecessors, and when should it be viewed as fundamentally 
different from our current understanding of a field? While the 
detail in the information provided by a GPS receiver includes 
precise measurements of altitude, latitude, and longitude that 
cannot be acquired by the human eye, the ultimate use of the data 
by law enforcement can conceivably be seen as in the same class 
of information that is available to an observer on the street. 
Jones' brief, on the other hand, argues that the GPS location 
data is fundamentally different from that gathered by the human 
eye because it involves complex calculations different in kind and 
quality from our vision systems.6 But instead of getting bogged 
down in technical minutiae, the court should examine our 
expectations that surround our personal information. Prior courts 
have noted, for example, that our expectations of privacy in a 
motor vehicle are "diminished,"7 but these estimations are 
obviously and necessarily based on a very different context from 
GPS tracking.8 That we volunteer some information when we 
drive in our cars is a natural conclusion, but that doesn't mean we 
volunteer it all. 
For instance, physical surveillance has natural limits that 
provide protection against unnecessary data collection which GPS 
tracking removes. As the amount of information acquired from 
physical surveillance scales upwards, the cost increases quickly, as 
each officer placed on the job is removed from another 
assignment. In contrast, GPS data can be automatically stored and 
examined collectively at a later point in time; the cost of acquiring 
location information after the initial placement of the GPS 
receiver is effectively zero. The harm thus is that the government, 
freed from the need to economize on its information gathering, is 
likely to gather large amounts of "innocent information," and not 
                                                   
6.    Brief for Respondent at 29, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259. 
7.    See U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
8.   See id. (Discussing specifically that driving voluntarily conveys information to 
"anyone who wanted to look" (emphasis added)). 
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requiring a warrant would place almost no restrictions on the 
ability of law enforcement to engage in this practice.9  
It remains to be seen what lens the Court will use to analyze 
this issue. A highly formalistic analysis essentially requires a 
blanket determination to be made that GPS tracking either is or is 
not the same as physical surveillance techniques. This approach 
would skirt the real question at the core of our Fourth 
Amendment law: what outcome would best accord with our own 
reasonable expectations of privacy, and the values that this 
expectation reflects? As technology changes, we need to be able to 
revisit areas of law to maintain the desired balance of interests at 
stake. Allowing law enforcement to use systems like these 
unchecked and without warrants would constitute a broad 
expansion of their power and a corresponding encroachment on 
our right to privacy. It would be disappointing if analogies 
between GPS tracking systems and the human eye distract us 
from the underlying issues in the case. 
  
                                                   
9.     See Brief for Respondent at 25-26, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259. 
